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Abstract
We examine the introduction of a gender quota law in Germany, mandating a min-
imum 30% of the underrepresented gender on the supervisory boards of a particular
type of firms. We exploit the fact that Germany has a two-tier corporate system con-
sisting of the affected supervisory boards and unaffected management boards within
the same firm. We find a positive effect on the female share on supervisory boards
of affected firms, but no effect on presidency of the board or its size. We also study
whether the increased female representation has had an effect on the financial perfor-
mance of the firm and conclude that, unlike some previous studies in other countries,
there has not been any negative effect on the profitability of the firm, neither at the
time when the law was announced nor when it was passed.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we study the firm level effects of the introduction of a gender quota on
supervisory boards. Starting in January 2016, German law mandates a minimum 30 percent
representation of each gender on supervisory boards of large private corporations that are
both listed and subject to full co-determination.1 Since the share of women sitting on
boards of German corporations is historically low, this law introduced a de facto legally
binding and enforceable female quota. Prior to the quota, less than 20 percent of board
positions were held by women (Holst and Wrohlich, 2018). Justice Minister Heiko Maas
defined the effective contribution of the quota as, “historic [. . . ] the greatest contribution to
gender equality since women got the vote” in 1918 (Smale and Miller, 2015). Quotas, some
argue, are the first step in the direction of advancing the case for women in all spheres of
business and public life. Increased female representation in the upper echelons of firms not
only promotes more opportunities for other women today but it also provides role models
for future generations (Beaman et al., 2009).
This rosy view is not unanimously shared: the conservative party and representatives of
the business associations in Germany argued that positive discrimination may disadvantage
the most qualified person for the job. Indeed, if the scarce female representation in leading
roles is due to the women’s unwillingness to perform such roles or to the lack of sufficiently
prepared candidates, then positive discrimination measures may be inefficient. This ongoing
controversy about quotas makes it essential to study the instances in which gender quotas
have been used.
Germany was not the first European country to address the issue of female underrep-
resentation on boardrooms with quotas. Norway lead the way in 2003, requiring at least
40 percent of public limited company board members to be women. Many other countries,
including France, Spain and the Netherlands, have since introduced gender quotas, although,
in some cases, quotas are not legally binding. In this respect, the reform setup for super-
visory boards in Germany, where quotas are mandatory and subject to sanctions, is similar
to the Norwegian case, where quotas are mandatory. At the same time, Germany has a
1We describe the institutional background in detail in section 2.
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unique institutional feature of a two-tier corporate system, consisting of supervisory and
management boards, the latter being unaffected by the mandatory quotas. The possibility
to compare the outcomes of the two boards, within a single firm, gives us a stronger setting
to determine the causal effects of a gender quota on the composition of the board and to
have a say on the compulsory nature of the measure compared to previous studies.
As the first to introduce a quota, the Norwegian case has attracted more attention from
researchers, thusly it largely shapes the views we hold. An influential paper by Ahern and
Dittmar (2012) shows a large negative effect of the Norwegian gender quota on firm value:
looking at listed companies (around 500 firms), they estimate a 3.5 percent lower stock return
for the affected firms for the dates around the announcement and 12.4 percent decline in
Tobins Q in the following years, for a 10 percentage point increase of women. Matsa and
Miller (2013) conduct a similar analysis, focusing on the year that the gender quota was
introduced (2006), rather than the moment when the measure was approved (2003), finding
more modest results: in a sample of 104 listed companies they find that the ratio of operating
profits to assets was lower (by about 4 percentage points) in the affected firms relative to
firms that were unaffected by the law. A later work by Eckbo et al. (2016) replicates those
studies changing the date of the event and the sample selection, finding that none of the
previous finding are robust.
We find that the introduction of the mandatory gender quota in Germany had the in-
tended effect, increasing the proportion of female seats on supervisory board of affected
firms by more than 10% with respect to the management boards and the unaffected firms.
At the same time, the reform does not affect size of supervisory boards nor does it increase
the probability of women to become an elected chairperson. We also find that the change
in gender composition of supervisory boards is, to a minor extent, driven by the so-called
‘golden skirts’ effect, meaning that same women start holding more seats on different boards
as a result of the quota introduction. Unlike the Norwegian studies, we do not find a negative
effect of the quota on firm profitability, as measured by the log of earnings before interest,
taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA), return on equity, return on assets, and the
log of wages and salaries, neither when the reform was announced (2013) nor when it was
implemented (2015).
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Several studies analyze the introduction of a quota in countries other than Norway: Tyre-
fors and Jansson (2017) explore the consequences of the threat of a quota in Sweden while
Ferrari et al. (2018) and Maida and Weber (2019) look at a temporary gender quota for
Italian boardrooms of listed companies. Both a failed quota announcement and a temporary
quota are different experiment setups than a permanent mandatory quota, which is the main
focus of this paper. To the best of our knowledge, Bozhinov et al. (2018) is the only paper
empirically studying the German quota. They focus exclusively on the role of women on
the boards of affected firms, finding that women are less likely to obtain membership on
important board committees than before the quota introduction.
Beyond the scope of determining the economic consequences of a gender quota, the paper
also contributes to the more general understanding of how the presence of women on boards
propagates its effects within firms (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Ferreira and Kirchmaier, 2013;
Pathan and Faff, 2013; Bertrand et al., 2018).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: details of the reform that took place
in Germany are presented in section 2. Section 3 describes the data and the empirical
strategy, while section 4 analyzes the effects of the quota on the composition of the boards.
Section 5 explores the economic consequences for the firm. Robustness checks are presented
in section 6. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 Institutional background
For a long time, Germany has been pursuing the objective of greater diversity, especially
gender diversity.2 In 2011, after ten years of voluntary measures failing to promote a true
advancement of women, Labor Minister Ursula von der Leyen announced she had plans for
a rigid legal gender quota for leading positions in the private sector (Dettmer and Pfister,
2011). However, within the same government, Family Minister Kristina Schro¨der favored a
weaker “flexi-quota,” which amounted to companies setting voluntary targets for themselves.
The case was settled when Chancellor Angela Merkel, the party leader, sided with the Family
2Diversity in the election of the management board, the executive staff, and in the composition of the
supervisory board is enshrined in the German corporate governance code since 2002 (Burow et al., 2018).
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Minister stating that she preferred a “flexi-quota,” partly in the interest of harmony with
their coalition partners, the liberal party FDP (‘Battle with Brussels’, 2013). Merkel went on
to oppose the attempt by the European Union to impose a Europe-wide gender quota for the
supervisory boards of stock market-listed companies, arguing that such laws should be passed
by the national parliaments and, in April 2013, the conservative ruling coalition formed by
her party, the CDU, its Bavarian counterpart, the CSU, and the FDP blocked a proposal
by the opposition in the Bundestag to pass a minimum female board representation (‘Battle
with Brussels’, 2013).
In September 2013, Germany held a federal parliamentary election. The CDU/CSU coali-
tion won with an ample margin, only five seats away from the absolute majority. However,
the FDP, their junior coalition partner strongly opposing the quota, fell short of meeting
the 5% vote threshold, denying them seats in the Bundestag for the first time in their his-
tory. This result was completely unanticipated by the pre-election polls. As a result, the
CDU/CSU and the Social Democrats (SPD) formed a new governing “Grand Coalition” that
was favorable to the introduction of the quota. We view the unanticipated election results as
an unexpected shock that changed the entrenched status-quo and enabled the enactment of
a gender quota. Conversely, prior to 2013, the FDP and Chancellor Merkel’s own resistance
to the quota, along with the reluctance of business organizations to change their conduct,
made it difficult to believe that the quota was a credible threat.
In March 2015, the Law on Equal Participation of Women and Men in Leadership Po-
sitions in the Private and Public Sector3 entered into force. It gave companies a deadline
until January 1, 2016 to comply with the quota.
Although the mandatory nature of the German gender quota makes it highly comparable
to the Norwegian case, there are three distinct institutional elements in Germany that are
crucial for the implementation and the consequences of a quota. Two relate to the particular
corporate governance structure in the German tradition (the two-tier board system and the
co-determination regime) and the last is a key feature of the design of the gender quota law,
namely, the existence of sanctions for non-compliance.
3Gesetz fu¨r die gleichberechtigte Teilhabe von Frauen und Ma¨nnern an Fu¨hrungspositionen in der Pri-
vatwirtschaft und im o¨ffentlichen Dienst of April 30, 2015 (Bundesgesetzblatt Jahrgang 2015 Teil I Nr. 17
S. 642).
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The corporate structure in Germany is regulated by the Stock Corporation Act.4 It
establishes a mandatory two-tier structure with a management board (Vorstand), which
serves the executive duties in the firm, and a supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat), which holds
the functions of control and monitoring. The management board deals with the day-to-
day objectives of the firm, whereas supervisory board acts as a check-and-balance of the
first board and appoints its members, alongside setting long-term goals and integrating
the voices of other firm stakeholders (like employees, lobbies, etc.). Moreover, the Co-
determination Act5 requires that half of the appointees of the supervisory board are employee
representatives in all companies with more than 2000 employees (1000 employees for the coal
and steel industry companies). Workers have the same weight in the supervisory board as
shareholder representatives, except for the tie-breaking vote of the chairman, who must
be appointed by the shareholders. That is why this system is sometimes called parity co-
determination or full parity, as opposed to one third co-determination, which is in place
for companies with 500 to 2000 employees. The distinction between the capital side and
the employee side of the board simply establishes whether a member has been proposed
and elected by the employees or by the shareholders of the firm, but it does not make any
difference regarding their functional role and voting rights.
According to the gender quota law, all listed companies with full co-determination shall
adopt: i) a mandatory 30% quota of the underrepresented gender on supervisory boards
(Aufsichtsrat) or administrative boards (Verwaltungsrat); and ii) voluntary quotas individ-
ually determined by each company for the members of its executive or management board
(Vorstand). A mandatory quota means that there are sanctions for non-compliance. Non-
compliant elections results are automatically declared void. The seats will remain vacant
until new elections are held or a member is appointed by the court.6 Additionally, failure
to meet the quota constitutes an administrative offence that can be punished with up to
a e50,000 fine. Sanctions are enforced: Villeroy & Boch, a ceramics manufacturer, was
forced to leave a position on its supervisory board vacant for several months in 2018 (Anger,
4Aktiengesetz of September 6, 1965 (Bundesgesetzblatt I S. 1089).
5Gesetz u¨ber die Mitbestimmung der Arbeithnehmer of May 4th, 1976 (Bundesgesetzblatt I S.1153).
6Even if vacant seats are not an obstacle to the functioning of the board, as long as there is a quorum,
it could imbalance the voting power between the employer and the employee sides of the board.
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2018). In Norway, on the contrary, the law did not contemplate strong sanctions until it was
amended two years after its passing to include the threat of dissolution of non-compliant
companies (Storvik and Teigen, 2010).
The design of the German law allows us to compare directly the composition of the su-
pervisory board, where compliance is mandatory, with that of the management board, where
it is voluntary. This legal feature is useful in order to distinguish the impact of the quota
from other confounding effects at the firm level. Whenever a reform to the legal framework
is introduced, there is a concern with identification because firms fall into the categories of
either affected by the law or not affected by the law. Determining the appropriate counter-
factual becomes an issue. In order to compare the two groups, we must assume that the
firms are affected by the quota in a quasi-random way. That is, that the characteristics that
made them affected are not correlated to the outcomes we seek to attribute to the reform.
We discuss whether this assumption is reasonable in this case in the next paragraph. How-
ever, the German two-tier board structure provides a unique identification strategy: we can
measure the effect of the quota on the share of women on each type of board within the
same firm.
Finally, the major issue in the Norwegian case is that boards of all public limited compa-
nies, inter-municipal, and state-owned enterprises were simultaneously affected by the quota
law. This included all listed firms. It is difficult, as we mentioned before, to find a control
group; with the so-far existing literature (Ahern and Dittmar, 2012; Matsa and Miller, 2013;
Eckbo et al., 2016; Bertrand et al., 2018) using either non-listed Norwegian firms or listed
firms from other Scandinavian countries. In comparison, the German law affects listed com-
panies only if they are subject to full co-determination. This allows us to use subsamples
of the data set as the control group. These are firms that are more similar to those of the
group of affected companies because they share at least one of the two characteristics that
made them subject to the law; that is, they are either listed but not subject to full co-
determination or not listed but subject to full co-determination. That said, we acknowledge
that this is also not a perfect control group. To the extent that the largest most important
German companies are usually listed and have a large number of employees, thus subject to
full co-determination, they may still be different than the rest.
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3 Empirical strategy
3.1 Data
For the analysis, we employ the propriety database ‘Die Großen 500’ (The Largest 500),7
which includes annual information for the 1,010 largest German firms, of which 7.71% are
banks, 8.62% are insurance companies, and the rest are non-financial firms. Specifically,
the database provides data on directors, both entering the supervisory and the management
board. We focus on the years from 2008 to 2016, thus ensuring we have a sufficiently long pre-
reform period to study the common trend and potential anticipation of the reform. Under
the gender quota law, around 100 companies are affected, that is, they are listed and are
subject to full co-determination. We have 77 in our database and more than eight times that
many firms that are not affected by the quota. The total number of firms per year can be
seen in table 1. The sample of firms is spread across various industries and regions,8 such
that the effect is unlikely to be driven by a specific sector nor it is confined to a specific
region.
[Table 1 about here]
Importantly the database contains information about the composition of the board,
namely the names of all the members who belong either to the management board or the
supervisory board with an indication of who the chairperson is. Moreover, among the mem-
bers of the supervisory board, it distinguishes whether they are affiliated to the capital side
(Kapitalseite) or the employee side (Arbeitnehmerseite) of the board.
7‘Die Großen 500’ database (“Die Großen 500. Deutschlands Top-Unternehmen mit Anschriften, Man-
agement und Gescha¨ftszahlen”, Muessig-Verlags, 2016) comes from a German provider that hand-collects
the information based on public records, mainly the annual reports of the companies.
8The distribution of industries in the sample is: automobile industries (1.31%), chemical companies
(4.70%), sale and purchase associations (1.29), food and beverage companies(1.73%), pharmaceutical com-
panies (1.38%), steel industries (1.31%), services sector (2.43%), power supply companies (4.94%), whole
and retail food trade (1.02%), trade (1.39%), holding (3.61%), car import (1.20%), car equipment indus-
tries (2.45%), mechanical engineering (4.68%), media (1.46%), mineral oil industry (1.08%) and retail trade
(1.44%). Regarding the regions distribution, North Rhine-Westphalia is home to the largest number of firms
in the data set, amounting to a total of 29.84% of the total firms. Bavaria and Hesse had 15.9% and 15%
firms, respectively, followed by Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, which had the fourth largest number of firms at 13.03%.
All the other regions combined amount to 26.23%.
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As seen in table 2, the sample average board size is 7 members, with a minimum of
one board seat and a maximum of 40. The average size is higher in the supervisory board
(9 members) than the management board (4 members). Women hold a minority of the
board seats: an average of 0.18 members of the management board are female and up to 1.6
members in the supervisory board. There are more than 45% of firms without any women
on their supervisory boards and more than 80% without any women on their management
board.
[Table 2 about here]
In out database, board members are classified by gender, based on their first name. We
listed all names of the board members and ran a script assigning them manually to the
categories ‘male’ or ‘female’ whenever there was no ambiguity regarding their gender. If
this classification was not possible on the base of the first name alone (for instance, if the first
name was foreign or is indistinctive for males or females), we performed a search for the name
and surname on the Internet, looking for public records, journal articles, or other business
data sources where the person was referenced. Then, we assigned the gender according to
the visual inspection of a picture or the personal pronouns used to refer to the person or
their job title.9
We complemented the database with financial data from Datastream and Compustat
Global by matching the company name. This merger produced a reduced sample of about
one-fourth of the original database (237 distinct firms) from 2008 to 2017. Summary statistics
of the main variables are shown in Table 3.
[Table 3 about here]
9Since most documents were in German, we were able to use the gender difference in the termination of
the job titles that is frequent in the German language. For instance, a male CEO would be referred to as
‘Vorsitzender’ whereas a female CEO would be ‘Vorsitzende.’
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3.2 Empirical specification
The intended effect of the law is to “promote equality between men and women and ... reduce
structural discrimination” against women (article 1.(1).2) of the Law on Equal Participation
of Women and Men in Leadership Positions in the Private and Public Sector). By explicitly
addressing the proportion of women sitting on supervisory boards, we presume that the
lawmakers seek, first and foremost, to balance gender representation on the supervisory
board, to promote females to the highest ranks of the firms, and, additionally, to foster
better opportunities for women candidates to board membership. Thus, in the first part of
the analysis, we focus on the effects of the quota to achieve the aforementioned objectives
by looking at the composition of the board. Using a triple differences set-up, we estimate
the following specification by OLS with robust standard errors:
Yb,i,t = α + β1Affectedi + β2Post-2013t + β3Boardb + (3.1)
β4Affectedi × Post-2013t + β5Affectedi × Boardb + β6Post-2013t × Boardb +
+β7Affectedi × Post-2013t × Boardb + θi + τt + ui,t,
where Yi,t are several outcomes measuring the composition of the board, Affectedi is a dummy
variable that takes value 1 if the firm is affected by the gender quota law and 0 otherwise,
Post-2013t is a dummy variable that takes value 1 in the post-treatment years and 0 in the
pre-treatment years, and Boardb a dummy variable that takes value 1 for the supervisory
board and 0 for the management board. The specification includes year, board, and firm
fixed effects.
As we stated before, the German law makes gender quotas mandatory only for the su-
pervisory board, whereas the management board remains unaffected. Having both a treated
and an untreated board in the affected firms allows a more robust approach to identifying
the effect of the quota than the most common approach of differences-in-differences. In
particular, we use a different treatment and control group (supervisory board versus man-
agement board) within the treatment state (affected companies). This way we take into
account firm-specific trends that influence gender compositions of both boards.
The treatment group consists of affected firms based on the list by the ‘Managerinnen-
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Barometer’ of DIW Berlin,10 which classifies the firms according to the two criteria required
by the law. We also cross-checked this list with the one produced by the Hans-Bo¨ckler-
Stiftung, a foundation that undertakes research in the areas of business and administration
in Germany. The control group in the baseline specification contains all the other firms in
the sample that are not affected: that is, the remaining large German firms that are not
subject to the gender quota.11 As we explained before, we consider the treatment year to
be 2013. We believe there are no anticipatory effects going back beyond 2013, when the
unexpected exit from parliament of the historic junior coalition partner of the winning party
forced a change in the governing coalition and prompted a reversal in the political consensus
about the gender quota.
The triple differences estimator δˆ7 in equation (3.1) is:
δˆ7 = (Y¯Affected,AR,Post − Y¯Affected,AR,Pre)
− (Y¯Non-affected,AR,Post − Y¯Non-affected,AR,Pre)
− (Y¯Affected,VST,Post − Y¯Affected,VST,Pre),
that is, the difference in the share of females on the supervisory board (AR) of eligible firms
before (Pre) and after (Post) the reform, netting out the effects of the change in means for
the supervisory board of non-affected firms and the effect of the change in means for the
management board (VST) of affected firms. This specification deals with the possibility that
affected and non-affected firms are subject to systematically different changes besides the
gender-quota reform.
Clearly, this triple differences approach is only possible when we evaluate the effect of
the quota on the composition of the boards; which may be different for the supervisory
and the management boards of the same company. The effect of the quota on the financial
performance of the firm may not be evaluated separately for each board. In the second part
10We thank Elke Holst, Gender Studies Research Director at DIW Berlin, for sharing this information
with us.
11In the second part of the analysis, we use two alternative control groups of firms that are ‘almost
affected’ by law. Since we are using a triple differences approach, at this point, we prefer not to restrict our
control group and let the complete set of fixed effects (time, firm and board fixed effects) deal with potential
unobserved heterogeneity.
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of the analysis, we study how the increased presence of women affected the firm performance
using a difference-in-difference specification as in equation (3.2).
Yi,t = α + β1Affectedi + β2Post-2013t + β3Affectedi × Post-2013t + θi + τt + ui,t, (3.2)
where Yi,t are firm-level financial variables and the treatment is defined as before: firms that
fulfill the criteria of the law times a dummy for the year 2013 and after. The control group
in this part of the analysis are firms that share one of the two requirements of the law with
the treated firms. That way, we ensure that they are more similar to the treated group in
one of the two relevant dimensions at a time. The hypothesis is that the composition of the
supervisory board in absence of the quota may have been optimally configured; thus, any
interference may be potentially detrimental to the profitability of the firm. Moreover, Matsa
and Miller (2013) argue that females have a different leadership style that may be reflected
in their personnel decisions, which in turn may also have an effect on the economic outcomes
of the firm.
4 Effect of the quota on board composition
Figure 1 plots the share of women in affected (solid line) versus non-affected (dotted line)
firms. The increase in the difference in the average share of women across firm groups is the
largest on the supervisory board, as opposed to the management board, where the difference
is not noticeable for affected and non-affected firms. Further, the rate of growth in the
supervisory board is larger for the affected firms than for the non-affected ones. From the
graph, however, it is not clear whether this effect is driven by the introduction of the law or
it is an exacerbation of a secular trend.
[Figure 1 about here]
In order to investigate the causal effect of the quota on the share of women on the
supervisory board, we estimate equation (3.1) using triple differences (DDD). Results are
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shown in table 4. The share of women increases over time and female representation is higher
in the supervisory board than in the management board for affected as well as non-affected
firms. The group of affected firms does not have more women on the board in general. The
DDD estimator is positive and significant. The effect of the reform can be quantified as half
an additional woman. The mean increase in female representation on the supervisory board
of eligible firms is 9.3% higher than on the management board of the same firms.
[Table 4 about here]
Besides its direct effect on the share of female board members, a gender quota may have
other effects on the composition of the board. Note that the law imposes a percentage of
women, but it remains silent as to which seats these women have to fill. Firms may choose
to comply with the quota by creating additional board seats and filling them with women.
In this case, we should observe an increase in the size of the board of affected companies
driven by the desire to satisfy the law and not due to organizational needs. In column (1) of
table 5, we find no significant effect of the quota on board sizes. There is no evidence that
boards subject to the quota increased their average number of members after the reform when
compared to those boards not subject to the quota in the same firms and in non-affected
firms.
We now turn to the effect of the introduction of the quota on the probability that the
person chosen to be president of the board is female. An increase in the number of female
members on the board may imply that they have a greater chance of being elected chairperson
of such board. As seen in column (2) of table 5, the coefficient of the DDD estimator is very
small and insignificant: this suggests that women were not more likely to become elected
chairperson of the board.
Where do these female board members come from? First, we are interested to see whether
newly appointed women become board members for the first time or they are already sitting
on supervisory or management boards of other companies in our sample. The phenomenon,
known as the ‘golden skirts,’ consists of increasing female board participation by concentrat-
ing a larger number of board memberships in the hands of a few women. Consequently, those
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women accumulating more positions are highly demanded and the pay gap at the top of the
firm is possibly reduced but the quota does not serve the greater objective of increasing pro-
motions and pay for women at the lower levels of the corporate hierarchy. Some evidence of
this is found by Bertrand et al. (2018) for Norway. To test for the ‘golden skirts’ hypothesis,
we construct an index of the number of mandates for female and male board members in
every firm for each year. Whenever a person sits in more than one board simultaneously, we
call it a multiple mandate. The variable ‘Female mandates ratio’ is defined as the number of
multiple mandates for females divided by the number of multiple mandates for males, and
it varies across firms and over time. A ratio higher than 1 means that women are sitting on
more boards simultaneously than men. The effects after the reform can be found in column
(3) of table 5. We do find a very small positive effect in the ratio of female to male multiple
mandates, which seems to indicate that part of the increase in female representation benefits
women who were already serving on boards instead of increasing the participation of new
women (Bozhinov et al., 2018).
[Table 5 about here]
As shown in table 3, female participation is almost twice as high on the employee side of
supervisory boards compared to the capital side. Therefore, in the next step, we analyze the
effect of the quota separately on employee side versus capital side of the supervisory board.
Table 6 shows that the effect is present on both sides of the board. Hence, firms do not
seem to be filling only the employee side seats with female board members but they are also
present in the capital side of the supervisory board. Moreover, the opposite is true, and the
rise in the female share is higher on the capital side of firms. In total, the employee side of
the supervisory board still has more female representation, around 26% in 2016, compared
to 22% on the capital side.
[Table 6 about here]
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Next, we analyze the evolution of the share of women on the company boards over time,
inspecting the coefficient of the leads and lags around the treatment year (2013) in table 7.
The omitted year is 2013; hence, all coefficients must be interpreted with respect to this
baseline. The DDD coefficients for all years between 2008 and 2012 are insignificant. This
implies that, prior to the reform, there is no evidence that the two boards were on differing
trend. Conversely, after the gender quota became law in 2015, entering into force in 2016,
the representation of women on the boards of affected companies increased above their 2013
levels. As seen above, the first increase in the share of female representation in affected firms
occurs in 2013 (table 7). In 2015, when the quota law is approved, the share increases further
and it escalates again in 2016 as the law enters into force. The delayed effects could be due
to the fact that the same firms that increased the number of females on their boards before
- early adopters - deepen their commitment to increasing the share of females by hiring even
more women. Alternatively, it could be other firms that increased their share of women on
their board - late adopters - while the early adopters stay put. In the box plot in figure 2,
we can observe a shift upwards of the whole distribution of the share of females on boards
for affected companies over the years. The variance of the distribution does not shrink and
our data suggest that the late adopters are different companies than the early adopters.
[Table 7 about here]
[Figure 2 about here]
Comparing the characteristics of early adopters versus late adopters, in table 8, firms
that took steps earlier toward meeting the gender quota have, on average, fewer employees
than late adopters. They tend to have a lower share of females on board to start with
(in year 2012) but the average increase of the share is smaller compared to the increase of
late adopters in 2016. Smaller firms may have greater flexibility to make changes to their
supervisory boards, but they may also face a reduced pool of potential female board members
to choose from. It is reasonable to expect that they would like to act before larger firms do
in order to attract good candidates.
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[Table 8 about here]
5 Effect of the quota on economic performance
In this section, we study the effect of the gender quota on several measures of firm profitabil-
ity. We estimate equation (3.2) by OLS with robust standard errors using a difference-in-
difference approach. The dependent variables are the log of earnings before interest, taxes,
depreciation and amortization (log EBITDA), the return on assets (ROA), return on equity
(ROE), the size of the firm estimated as the log of assets, the log of the number of employees,
and log wages. The financial variables are winsorized at the 1% level.
Table 9 presents the estimates of the difference-in-difference coefficient for two different
control groups: the upper panel uses as a control group private firms subject to full co-
determination in 2012 and the lower panel uses as a control group public firms subject to
a weaker form of employee representation in 2012. Each of these groups shares with the
affected firms one of the two criteria that the law establishes for being subject to the quota;
the failure to meet the second requirement makes firms in the control groups ‘almost affected’
yet not legally bound by the quota.
The upper panel in table 9 presents the results of estimating equation (3.2) on the
sample of all firms subject to full co-determination in 2012; that is, all firms with 2000
employees or more. Since firms that are both listed and subject to full co-determination
are affected by the law, the control group contains firms that are private but have the
same range of employee numbers. The comparison is between public (treated) and private
(control) firms. Results show a strong and significant increase in the share of women on the
supervisory board, whereas such drive toward increased female representation is not present
on management boards. The same pattern is true for the lower panel in table 9; here the
sample comprises all public firms with 500 employees or more. Firms with between 500 and
2000 employees are subject to a weaker form of employee representation, under the One
Third Representation Act (Drittelbeteiligungsgesetzes), where one-third of the seats on the
board must be reserved for employees. Hence, the comparison is between public firms with
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full co-determination (treated) and with one-third employee representation (control). The
results regarding the effect of the quota on financial variables do not show a clear picture.
Coefficients are insignificant or economically small except for a higher log of EBITDA using
both control groups and a lower ROE only when we use the one-third representation control
group.
[Table 9 about here]
In table 10, we repeat the same analysis as in table 9, this time using 2015 as the
treatment period, the year when the gender quota law was actually implemented. As we saw
in the previous section, and we corroborate here, the share of women on supervisory boards
increased in the affected firms not only when the quota was announced, but also when it
was implemented. The share of women on the management board, on the contrary, did not.
The only consistent result regarding the effect of the quota on economic performance is a
mildly positive log of EBITDA.
[Table 10 about here]
Next, we focus on the intensive margin of adjustment to the quota law. In table 11, we
exploit the regulation of the Co-determination Act that determines the size of the board
for different firms. Firms with between 2,000 and 10,000 employees must have 12 seats on
the board; between 10,000 and 20,000 they must have 16 seats; and for more than 20,000
employees 20 seats. Larger boards require incorporating a larger number of women in order
to fulfill the 30% threshold. According to this strategy, the more women a company is forced
to integrate, the more intensely the effects of the reform will show. Looking only at affected
firms, we take this distance to compliance as an exogenous distribution about the effort
companies need to make in order to comply with the quota. This is an approach similar
to Ahern and Dittmar (2012), where they compute the distance from the pre-treatment share
of female representation to the quota. As we see in table 11, there is no significant increase
in the number of female board members on any board nor an effect on the financial variables.
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[Table 11 about here]
We discuss briefly whether the positive effect in EBITDA that we find above is concen-
trated in a geographical area. We compute the share of women on the supervisory board
at the regional level12 before the reform. A higher number means that the percentage of
women sitting on the supervisory boards of that region in 2012 was, on average, larger than
in a different region. As seen in table 12, the log of EBITDA is insignificant, except for
the fourth quantile, where it is large and positive. These are the firms in the region where
the share of women on board was highest from the onset. One explanation may be that
firms are not randomly assigned to a region and, thus, more progressive regions may have
a better attitude toward hiring women and are better able to extract their talent. Another
explanation is that firms in the fourth quantile region needed to incorporate fewer women
on average when the law passed. This explanation implies that a lower increase in female
participation raises earnings above their peers level. However, this conclusion is not trivial
since we do not know the average size of the board in each quantile: ceteris paribus, hiring
an additional women for a smaller boards increases the share of women more than in larger
boards. In table 12 we specify the effect of the reform on the number of women in each
board for all quantiles. The increase in the number of women in the supervisory board is the
smallest in the fourth quantile. However, if we consider changes in the management board
as well, there is no clear association between the number of women entering all boards and
the EBITDA of the firm.
[Table 12 about here]
Lastly, a comment on the plausibility of the result that an increase in the proportion
of women on the board does not have a negative effect on firm profitability. Earlier works
on the Norwegian law find a large negative effect of the quota, claiming that women have
a different leadership style (Matsa and Miller, 2013) - possibly, less effective - to explain
12We differentiate between Bundesla¨nder, being the NUTS-1 level of regional disaggregation.
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their results. Moreover, Ahern and Dittmar (2012) find evidence that the stock market pe-
nalized companies that were affected by the quota, the implication being that shareholders
anticipated a negative impact of the quota on results. Other works find insignificant re-
sults (Smith, 2014), as we do here, but an absence of significance does not necessarily mean
the effect of the quota on profitability is zero. We bring direct evidence on the perception of
firm stakeholders regarding the imminent introduction of a gender quota in tables 9 and 10.
As it appears that firms did not attempt to compensate for the mandatory increase in the
share of women on their supervisory board by reducing the number of women on their man-
agement board, we can infer that the perception of the quota was not negative. We are
able to observe an action that reveals the expectation of the stakeholders about the future
effect of the quota more directly than the stock prices. As seen above, we do not find any
negative effects of the introduction of the quota on any of the profitability measures taken
into consideration (return on assets, return on equity and operating profits), which seems to
corroborate the stakeholders expectations.
6 Robustness analysis
Placebo test for eligibility. We look at the same baseline regression as in (3.2) but using as
a definition of affected firms a subset of the sample randomly selected. As expected, we find
no effect for the placebo group of treated firms in the results in appendix A. The effect of
time on the increase of women across all boards - as reflected in the coefficient of the dummy
for the year 2013 - is consistent with the previous results.
Regional time trends. In the differences-in-differences specification, we assume that, in
the absence of the treatment, the average outcome in the treated and the control group would
have followed their pre-treatment trend. In order to weaken the assumption of parallel trends,
we allow the time trend to change in different regions by adding time and region interaction
terms:
Yi,r,t = α+ β1Eligiblei + β2Post-2013t + β3Eligiblei×Post-2013t + θi + τt + νr,t +ui,r,t, (6.1)
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where the subindex r indicates regional variation at the NUTS-1 level. In the case of equa-
tion (6.1), the treated and control groups are still assumed to have a common trend but
this trend is allowed to vary from region to region. Results in appendix B are significant for
the supervisory board and they are not for the management board, as it has been the case
throughout all specifications, and the magnitude of the coefficients is very similar.
Alternative control groups. In section 5, we use companies with one of the two char-
acteristics of eligibility under the quota law as the control group; that is, they are subject
to full co-determination but not listed or listed but subject to a weaker form of employee
representation. As a further robustness check, we look at a reduced control group using
propensity score matching to select the non-affected firms that are closest to the affected
firms from the point of view of the pre-treatment characteristics. This process takes place in
two steps. First, we estimate a probit regression of the affectedness on the several character-
istics of the firm: log EBITDA, ROE, ROA, size, log of employees, log wages, as well as their
first, second, third, and fourth differences to capture firms that are on a similar pre-reform
trend. Then we select the ‘closest neighbors’ for each treated firm as predicted by the probit
regression. Our implementation of propensity score matching uses matched firms as controls
weighted by their relative closeness to the treated units. Appendix C shows the comparison
of the variables for the matched and unmatched samples, with the results of the estimation
found in appendix D. The increase in the share of women in the supervisory board is even
larger than what we find in our baseline specification. The log EBITDA becomes larger
and is very significant and we also conclude that firms grow both in size and in number of
employees.
7 Conclusion
We study the introduction of a mandatory gender quota on the supervisory board of Ger-
many’s two-tier corporate system. The law affected listed companies that were subject to
the full co-determination regime of employee representation. It also considers the voluntary
targets by the companies themselves regarding the management board of the company and
by the rest of companies that were not specifically targeted by the law. This feature of
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the German quota law provides us a special insight into a relevant policy question: how
do mandated quotas perform relative to voluntary quotas to achieve the policymakers pur-
ported goal of “gender balance in the boardroom”? We are able to exploit the variation in
treatment across boards within the same firm, created exogenously by the law, and across
firms that are affected, or not, by the regulation. We find a significant effect of the quota
on the share of women on the supervisory board of about 10% percentage points (which,
on average, means slightly more than one additional woman). On the contrary, there is no
effect in the proportion of women serving on the management board, where all companies
were asked to define their own quota freely. Our results present clear and robust evidence
that gender quotas achieve a higher female representation at the top of the company if they
are mandatory. Suggestions and recommendations are less effective, although we cannot
rule out that they may have an impact. This is in line with the very limited or non-existent
advancement the literature finds when quotas are not accompanied by sanctions (Smith,
2014). Our second main result is that we cannot find a negative effect of the quota on the
profitability of the firm when looking at the earnings before interest, taxes, amortization and
depreciation (EBITDA), at return on equity, and at return on assets. In some specifications,
we find a mild increase in EBITDA, especially in regions where female representation on the
board was high before the reform took place.
The increase in female participation at the board appears to be financially costless. We
view this evidence as consistent with the fact that companies could have compensated the
mandated increase in one board by decreasing the share or the number of women in the other
board in order to avoid any unforeseen negative consequences of adding women. We find
no evidence of this, suggesting that they did not expect to suffer a financial loss, which is
corroborated by our analysis. Whether additional costs of the quota implementation would
appear in the long run, as well as what kind of benefits accrue to the firms and society are
matters for future research.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Evolution of the share of women on supervisory boards and management boards
from 2008 through 2016 by affectedness
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Note: An ‘affected’ company is defined as a company that satisfies the two criteria required by the law to fall
under the obligation of implementing a gender quota: being listed on the stock exchange and being subject
to the Co-determination Act. The rest are considered ‘non-affected.’
Source: Muessig Verlag (2016): Die Großen 500.
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Figure 2: Distribution of the share of women on the supervisory boards of affected firms by
year (whiskers box plot)
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Note: An ‘affected’ company is defined as a company that satisfies the two criteria required by the law to fall
under the obligation of implementing a gender quota: being listed on the stock exchange and being subject
to the Co-determination Act.’ The share of women is in percentage.
Source: Muessig Verlag (2016): Die Großen 500.
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Table 1: Number of firms per year by affectedness
Staus Non-Affected Affected Total
2008 805 66 871
(92.4) (7.6) (100.0)
2009 823 70 893
(92.2) (7.8) (100.0)
2010 842 73 915
(92.0) (8.0) (100.0)
2011 855 72 927
(92.2) (7.8) (100.0)
2012 856 73 929
(92.1) (7.9) (100.0)
2013 752 73 825
(91.2) (8.8) (100.0)
2014 742 76 818
(90.7) (9.3) (100.0)
2015 739 77 816
(90.6) (9.4) (100.0)
2016 621 77 698
(89.0) (11.0) (100.0)
Total 7035 657 7692
(91.5) (8.5) (100.0)
Note: An ‘affected’ company is defined as a company that satisfies the two criteria required by the law to fall
under the obligation of implementing a gender quota: being listed on the stock exchange and being subject
to the Co-determination Act. The rest are considered ‘non-affected.’ Percentages are in parentheses.
Source: Muessig Verlag (2016): Die Großen 500.
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Table 2: Board size
count mean sd min max
Members management board 7219 4.2 2.0 1 16
Members supervisory board 7674 8.9 7.0 0 40
Supervisory board employee side 4254 5.6 2.6 1 14
Supervisory board capital side 5671 6.7 3.6 1 37
Female members management board 7219 0.2 0.5 0 4
Female members supervisory board 4227 1.7 1.6 0 8
Female members supervisory board employee side 4254 1.1 1.2 0 8
Female members supervisory board capital side 5671 0.6 1.0 0 7
Note: The first column presents the number of observations, the second presents the mean value, the third
presents the standard deviation, and the fourth and fifth columns present the minimum and maximum value
respectively.
Source: Muessig Verlag (2016): Die Großen 500.
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Table 3: Summary statistics of the main variables
count mean sd min max
Log EBITDA 1492 13.13 1.72 5.83 17.50
ROA 1157 3.03 6.33 -39.34 50.80
ROE 1153 6.57 29.10 -404.93 99.77
Firm size 2676 15.19 1.71 11.63 20.05
Log employment 5691 8.53 1.72 1.61 13.37
Log wages 985 3.35 1.61 -3.27 5.99
Note: EBITDA are earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization, ROE is net income
divided by equity, ROA net income divided by assets, firm size is the log of the total assets, employment is
the number of workers in the firm, and wages per employee are wages and salaries divided by the number of
employees. The first column presents the number of observations, the second presents the mean value, the
third presents the standard deviation, and the fourth and fifth columns present the minimum and maximum
value respectively.
Source: Muessig Verlag (2016): Die Großen 500, Datastream and Compustat Global.
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Table 4: Effect of the gender quota on the share of women on the board
All sample Non-financial Firms
firms West Germany
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share women Average share Share women Share women
Time dummy 3.950∗∗∗ 2.177∗∗∗ 3.280∗∗∗ 4.038∗∗∗
(0.425) (0.324) (0.474) (0.434)
Affected 1.295 -0.924 1.160 1.193
(1.565) (0.937) (1.568) (1.566)
Supervisory board 4.709∗∗∗ 4.662∗∗∗ 3.742∗∗∗ 4.477∗∗∗
(0.190) (0.162) (0.212) (0.192)
Time dummy × Affected × Supervisory board 4.571∗∗∗ 4.428∗∗∗ 4.670∗∗∗ 4.878∗∗∗
(0.898) (0.736) (0.936) (0.909)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 13922 14085 11424 13034
R-squared 0.47 0.55 0.47 0.45
F-statistic 153.07 219.73 102.53 139.61
Note: The independent variable is the annual share of female members over the total members of the board
in column (1), (3), and (4), with the average share of females in all periods before and after the reform in
column (2). The treatment year is 2013. Affected firms are those that satisfied the requirements of the quota
law: being listed and subject to parity co-determination under the Co-determination Act. Supervisory board
is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for the supervisory board and 0 for the management board. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. Significance * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: Muessig Verlag (2016): Die Großen 500.
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Table 5: Effect of the gender quota on the board size, female president and female mandates
ratio
(1) (2) (3)
Board size Female Female mandates
president ratio
Time dummy 0.035 0.006 0.058∗∗∗
(0.155) (0.007) (0.007)
Affected -2.016∗∗∗ -0.007 0.031
(0.432) (0.007) (0.026)
Supervisory board 4.764∗∗∗ 0.004 0.036∗∗∗
(0.0826) (0.003) (0.003)
Time dummy × Affected × Supervisory board 0.489 -0.012 0.032∗
(0.301) (0.016) (0.013)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 14893 13011 14072
R-squared 0.63 0.35 0.43
F-statistic 691.65 2.48 72.33
Note: The independent variable is the board size measured as the number of members of the board in
column (1), a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the president of the board is female and zero otherwise
in column (2) and the ratio of female to male multiple board mandates in column (3). The treatment year is
2013. Affected firms are those that satisfied the requirements of the quota law: being listed and subject to
parity co-determination under the Co-determination Act. Supervisory board is a dummy variable that takes
value 1 for the supervisory board and 0 for the management board. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Significance * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: Muessig Verlag (2016): Die Großen 500.
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Table 6: Effect of the gender quota on the employee side and capital side of supervisory
boards
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. var: share women Total Employee side Capital side
Time dummy 3.950∗∗∗ 3.740∗∗∗ 4.594∗∗∗
(0.425) (0.576) (0.473)
Affected 1.295 3.987 1.371
(1.565) (2.471) (1.798)
Supervisory board 4.709∗∗∗ 14.88∗∗∗ 2.451∗∗∗
(0.190) (0.373) (0.218)
Time dummy × Affected × Supervisory board 4.571∗∗∗ 3.440∗ 4.724∗∗∗
(0.898) (1.369) (1.077)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 13922 11893 13310
R-squared 0.47 0.55 0.43
F-statistic 153.07 231.47 74.14
Note: The independent variable is the share of female members over the total members of the board and
each respective side of the supervisory board. The treatment year is 2013. Affected firms are those that
satisfied the requirements of the quota law: being listed and subject to parity co-determination under the
Co-determination Act. Supervisory board is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for the supervisory board
and 0 for the management board. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01.
Source: Muessig Verlag (2016): Die Großen 500.
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Table 7: Effect of the gender quota on the share of women on the supervisory board over
time
All sample Non-financial Firms
firms West Germany
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share women Average share Share women Share women
Affected 3.220 -0.413 3.269 3.022
(1.875) (1.261) (1.914) (1.884)
Affected × Supervisory board 4.751∗∗∗ 7.742∗∗∗ 4.413∗∗ 5.258∗∗∗
(1.402) (1.132) (1.459) (1.422)
Affected × Year=2008 × Supervisory board 0.139 -4.549∗∗ 1.069 -0.411
(1.869) (1.570) (1.949) (1.891)
Affected × Year=2009 × Supervisory board -1.350 -4.127∗∗ -0.439 -1.896
(1.843) (1.544) (1.904) (1.864)
Affected × Year=2010 × Supervisory board -2.594 -4.441∗∗ -1.511 -2.982
(1.927) (1.554) (1.993) (1.952)
Affected × Year=2011 × Supervisory board -1.815 -4.714∗∗ -0.978 -2.129
(1.934) (1.560) (1.989) (1.960)
Affected × Year=2012 × Supervisory board -2.182 -4.622∗∗ -1.852 -2.410
(1.917) (1.554) (1.947) (1.943)
Affected × Year=2014 × Supervisory board 2.537 -0.0481 2.993 2.541
(1.904) (1.587) (1.971) (1.932)
Affected X Year=2015 X Supervisory board 4.143∗ 0.103 5.446∗∗ 4.025∗
(1.879) (1.580) (1.966) (1.906)
Affected × Year=2016 × Supervisory board 4.988∗ -0.368 6.937∗∗ 4.611∗
(2.025) (1.595) (2.145) (2.046)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 13922 14085 11424 13034
R-squared 0.47 0.55 0.47 0.45
F-statistic 64.20 87.80 44.62 58.66
Note: The independent variable is the share of female members over the total members of the board in column
(1), (3), and (4), with the average share of females in all periods before and after the reform in column (2).
Affected firms are those that satisfied the requirements of the quota law: being listed and subject to parity
co-determination under the Co-determination Act. Supervisory board is a dummy variable that takes value
1 for the supervisory board and 0 for the management board. Time dummies have been included for years
2008 to 2016. The omitted year is 2013. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: Muessig Verlag (2016): Die Großen 500.
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Table 8: Descriptive statistics of affected firms which increased the share of women on board
in 2013 (early adopters) and in 2016 (late adopters).
Early adopters
count mean sd min max
Employees 31 46083.39 62829.99 1578 269493
East Germany 31 0.00 0.00 0 0
West Germany 31 1.00 0.00 1 1
Banks 31 0.10 0.30 0 1
Non-financial firms 31 0.87 0.34 0 1
Insurance 31 0.03 0.18 0 1
Pre-share women 30 10.91 8.21 0 30
Change in share women 30 8.77 7.89 1 33
Late adopters
count mean sd min max
Employees 30 47568.20 96092.20 3539 508036
East Germany 31 0.03 0.18 0 1
West Germany 31 0.97 0.18 0 1
Banks 31 0.10 0.30 0 1
Non-financial firms 31 0.90 0.30 0 1
Insurance 31 0.00 0.00 0 0
Pre-share women 31 11.91 9.41 0 33
Change in share women 28 7.82 5.13 2 28
Note: The first column presents the number of observations, the second presents the mean value, the third
presents the standard deviation, and the fourth and fifth columns present the minimum and maximum value
respectively.
Source: Muessig Verlag (2016): Die Großen 500.
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Table 9: Effect of the gender quota on economic performance at the time of the announcement.
Supervisory board Management board Financial variables
Private firms full co-determination
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Share women Share women Log EBITDA ROA ROE Firm size Log employment Log wages
Diff-in-Diff 4.333∗∗∗ -0.356 0.142∗ 0.231 -6.317 0.0281 0.0113 -0.395∗
(0.461) (0.563) (0.0624) (0.734) (3.356) (0.0245) (0.0207) (0.153)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3563 4211 1223 934 934 1979 3901 862
R-squared 0.77 0.57 0.92 0.46 0.24 0.98 0.96 0.62
F-statistic 68.69 12.94 7.66 4.15 2.56 20.09 10.21 2.58
Public firms 1/3 representation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Share women Share women Log EBITDA ROA ROE Firm size Log employment Log wages
Diff-in-Diff 5.093∗∗∗ 0.268 0.294∗∗∗ -0.812 -14.02∗ 0.208∗∗∗ 0.116∗ -0.0735
(0.796) (0.906) (0.0876) (0.832) (7.126) (0.0419) (0.0470) (0.182)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1106 1118 805 669 668 936 1205 574
R-squared 0.76 0.63 0.95 0.66 0.50 0.99 0.97 0.56
F-statistic 49.18 6.65 8.19 4.57 2.77 15.90 2.17 2.53
Note: The independent variable is the share of female members over the total members of the respective board in columns (1) and (2) and the
following financial variables: log of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization in column (3), return on assets in column (4), return
on equity in column (5), log of firm assets in column (6), log of the number of employees in column (7) and log of wages and salaries in column (8).
The treatment year is 2013. Affected firms are those that satisfied the requirements of the quota law when it was passed: being listed and subject to
parity co-determination under the Co-determination Act. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Source: Muessig Verlag (2016): Die Großen 500, Datastream and Compustat Global.
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Table 10: Effect of the gender quota on economic performance at the time of the implementation.
Supervisory board Management board Financial variables
Private firms full co-determination
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Share women Share women Log EBITDA ROA ROE Firm size Log employment Log wages
Diff-in-Diff 4.391∗∗∗ -0.966 0.176∗∗ 1.018 0.541 0.0664 0.0316 -0.450∗
(0.607) (0.677) (0.0662) (0.579) (2.450) (0.0350) (0.0387) (0.180)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3563 4211 1223 934 934 1979 3901 862
R-squared 0.77 0.57 0.92 0.46 0.23 0.98 0.96 0.62
F-statistic 64.44 12.71 8.72 4.36 2.34 20.91 9.68 2.80
Public firms 1/3 representation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Share women Share women Log EBITDA ROA ROE Firm size Log employment Log wages
Diff-in-Diff 4.169∗∗ 0.258 0.249∗ -0.853 -6.439 0.240∗∗∗ 0.0928 0.105
(1.274) (1.473) (0.105) (0.693) (4.577) (0.0548) (0.0691) (0.217)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1106 1118 805 669 668 936 1205 574
R-squared 0.75 0.63 0.95 0.66 0.50 0.99 0.97 0.56
F-statistic 40.67 6.75 8.44 4.52 2.65 14.63 1.37 2.66
Note: The independent variable is the share of female members over the total members of the respective board in columns (1) and (2) and the
following financial variables: log of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization in column (3), return on assets in column (4), return
on equity in column (5), log of firm assets in column (6), log of the number of employees in column (7) and log of wages and salaries in column (8).
The treatment year is 2015. Eligible firms are those that satisfied the requirements of the quota law when it was passed: being listed and subject to
parity co-determination under the Co-determination Act. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Source: Muessig Verlag (2016): Die Großen 500, Datastream and Compustat Global.
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Table 11: Intensive margin of the effect of the gender quota in eligible firms.
Supervisory board Management board Financial variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Number females Number females Log EBITDA ROA ROE Firm size Log employment Log wages
Time dummy 1.631∗∗∗ 0.157 0.418∗ 0.943 1.147 0.298 0.0656 -0.575
(0.299) (0.0829) (0.208) (1.039) (2.874) (0.216) (0.130) (0.365)
Middle intensity 0.0658 0.0399 -0.240 -0.259 -0.381 -0.123 -0.0115 0.0119
(0.268) (0.0759) (0.212) (1.321) (3.398) (0.235) (0.0693) (0.309)
High intensity 0.226 0.260∗∗ -0.0448 -0.0673 -0.397 -0.0673 -0.0578 -0.278
(0.273) (0.0868) (0.188) (0.900) (2.597) (0.176) (0.115) (0.338)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 596 604 656 531 531 683 708 508
R-squared 0.21 0.10 0.54 0.08 0.08 0.55 0.72 0.04
F-statistic 15.69 5.02 63.82 2.65 2.50 77.14 156.81 1.72
Note: The independent variable is the share of female members over the total members of the respective board in columns (1) and (2) and the
following financial variables: log of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization in column (3), return on assets in column (4), return
on equity in column (5), log of firm assets in column (6), log of the number of employees in column (7) and log of wages and salaries in column
(8). The treatment year is 2013. Intensity of the treatment is measured as the size of the board mandated by law and it has three categories. Low
intensity is the omitted category. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Source: Muessig Verlag (2016): Die Großen 500, Datastream and Compustat Global.
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Table 12: Effect of the gender quota on board composition and log EBITDA by the pre-reform share of women on supervisory
board at the regional level
First quantile Second quantile
Supervisory board Management board Financial variables Supervisory board Management board Financial variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Share women Number women Share women Number women Log EBITDA Share women Number women Share women Number women Log EBITDA
Diff-in-Diff 6.251∗∗∗ 1.005∗∗∗ 3.160∗∗ 0.133∗ 0.0929 4.901∗∗∗ 0.662∗∗∗ 0.637 0.0982∗ -0.0504
(0.735) (0.129) (1.192) (0.0570) (0.0905) (0.934) (0.143) (0.990) (0.0496) (0.0972)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2155 1368 2623 2514 409 1328 902 1585 1512 356
R-squared 0.80 0.83 0.59 0.61 0.94 0.78 0.78 0.61 0.65 0.94
F-statistic 25.82 20.60 5.56 6.53 2.11 18.98 16.78 6.15 6.40 4.91
Third quantile Fourth quantile
Supervisory board Management board Financial variables Supervisory board Management board Financial variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Share women Number women Share women Number women Log EBITDA Share women Number women Share women Number women Log EBITDA
Diff-in-Diff 3.353∗∗∗ 0.437∗∗ -4.494∗∗∗ -0.183∗∗∗ 0.0518 4.344∗∗∗ 0.394∗∗∗ -1.371∗ -0.0124 0.476∗∗∗
(0.994) (0.150) (0.964) (0.0463) (0.127) (0.832) (0.116) (0.655) (0.0448) (0.118)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1372 990 1654 1562 289 1886 1299 2324 2159 496
R-squared 0.77 0.80 0.60 0.69 0.92 0.79 0.81 0.63 0.64 0.91
F-statistic 15.89 13.83 5.62 6.44 2.61 25.83 28.32 3.61 2.21 5.79
Note: The independent variable is the share of female members over the total members of the supervisory board in column (1), the number of female
members of the supervisory board in column (2), and the same for the management board in columns (3) and (4). The sample is divided by the
quantiles of the regional share of women in 2012. The treatment year is 2013. Eligible firms are those that satisfied the requirements of the quota law:
being listed and subject to parity co-determination under the Co-determination Act. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance * p < 0.1,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Source: Muessig Verlag (2016): Die Großen 500, Datastream and Compustat Global.
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A Placebo treatment group
Supervisory board Management board
All sample Non-financial firms All sample
(1) (2) (3)
Share women Share women Share women
Time dummy 6.085∗∗∗ 5.282∗∗∗ 3.820∗∗∗
(0.441) (0.468) (0.536)
Placebo Affected 0.0827 0.0668 0.295
(0.171) (0.170) (0.225)
Time dummy × Placebo Affected -0.0726 0.214 -0.321
(0.323) (0.338) (0.392)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6283 5040 7639
R-squared 0.78 0.80 0.61
F-statistic 46.67 35.89 14.63
Note: The independent variable is the share of female members over the total members of the supervisory
board in column (1) and (2), with the management board in column (3). The treatment year is 2013.
Placebo affected is a dummy that takes value 1 for a randomly selected subset of firms and 0 for the rest.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: Muessig Verlag (2016): Die Großen 500.
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B Difference-in-difference with regional time trends
Table 13: Effect of the introduction of the gender quota on the share of women on the
supervisory board with regional time trends.
Supervisory board
All sample Non-financial firms Firms West Germany
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share women Average share Share women Share women
Time dummy 6.048∗∗∗ 3.226∗∗∗ 5.221∗∗∗ 6.041∗∗∗
(0.961) (0.479) (0.992) (0.958)
Eligible 6.730∗∗ 1.720 7.030∗∗ 6.710∗∗
(2.235) (0.976) (2.255) (2.229)
Time dummy X Eligible 5.301∗∗∗ 5.294∗∗∗ 5.643∗∗∗ 5.345∗∗∗
(0.455) (0.303) (0.465) (0.457)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region X Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6250 6383 5012 5849
R-squared 0.79 0.89 0.81 0.79
F-statistic 7.01 13.14 5.91 8.80
Note: The independent variable is the share of female members over the total members of the supervisory
board in column (1), (3), and (4), with the average share of females in all periods before and after the reform
in column (2). The treatment year is 2013. Eligible firms are those that satisfied the requirements of the
quota law: being listed and subject to parity co-determination under the Co-determination Act. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. Significance * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Source: Muessig Verlag (2016): Die Großen 500.
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C Variables descriptive statistics in matched and un-
matched samples
Variable (Un)Matched Mean Mean %bias % reduct bias V(T)/V(C)
treated control
D.share U 23.484 13.608 16.6 1.14
M 23.484 19.161 7.3 56.2 1.39*
D.logEBITDA U .03342 .01556 5.0 0.23*
M .03342 .06026 -7.4 -50.3 0.20*
D2.logEBITDA U -.00381 -.01913 2.5 0.29*
M -.00381 -.03418 5.0 -98.3 0.12*
D3.logEBITDA U -.00743 .13507 -12.8 0.35*
M -.00743 -.15852 13.6 -6.0 0.12*
D4.logEBITDA U -.13062 .55201 -29.7 0.33*
M -.13062 -.45993 14.3 51.8 0.18*
D.ROA U -.2037 -.30068 2.1 0.09*
M -.2037 -.42881 5.0 -132.1 0.30*
D2.ROA U -.04529 -.12238 1.0 0.07*
M -.04529 -.29451 3.1 -223.3 0.11*
D3.ROA U .08478 15.041 -9.3 0.07*
M .08478 -11.243 7.9 14.8 0.06*
D4.ROA U -.55821 52.312 -19.5 0.08*
M -.55821 -47.593 14.2 27.4 0.05*
D.ROE U -.74053 -10.391 3.0 0.16*
M -.74053 -.28001 -4.6 -54.3 0.30*
D2.ROE U .32894 -.68938 6.1 0.14*
M .32894 14.871 -6.9 -13.7 0.18*
D3.ROE U .92018 28.503 -6.2 0.15*
M .92018 10.429 -0.4 93.6 0.14*
D4.ROE U -.82881 10.903 -19.6 0.16*
M -.82881 -49.188 6.8 65.1 0.13*
D.size U .05911 .03974 12.0 0.33*
M .05911 .0835 -15.1 -25.9 0.33*
D2.size U .00148 -.02354 12.4 0.47*
M .00148 .02016 -9.3 25.3 0.63*
D3.size U .00155 -.02907 9.7 0.57*
M .00155 .01156 -3.2 67.3 0.91
D4.size U .00115 .01328 -2.2 0.58*
M .00115 -.02752 5.1 -136.5 0.68*
D.logemploy U .02572 .02144 0.7 0.01*
M .02572 .04762 -3.8 -411.3 0.35*
D2.logemploy U -.04849 .01812 -6.8 0.20*
M -.04849 -.00982 -3.9 41.9 12.99*
D3.logemploy U -.08656 .0554 -8.0 0.96
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M -.08656 -.01654 -3.9 50.7 42.96*
D4.logemploy U -.11954 .11424 -7.0 2.90*
M -.11954 -.04602 -2.2 68.6 62.37*
D.logwages U .0132 -.03584 5.1 0.45*
M .0132 .01224 0.1 98.0 0.62*
D2.logwages U .07121 .10228 -1.9 0.51*
M .07121 .13918 -4.2 -118.8 0.62*
D3.logwages U .01578 .1914 -6.0 0.77
M .01578 .25441 -8.1 -35.9 0.88
D4.logwages U .00558 .25502 -4.7 1.25
M .00558 .64025 -11.9 -154.4 1.29
Note: * if variance ratio outside [0.82; 1.23] for Unmatched and [0.73; 1.37] for Matched.
Source: Muessig Verlag (2016): Die Großen 500, Datastream and Compustat Global.
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D Propensity score matching
Supervisory board Management board Financial variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Share women Share women Log EBITDA ROA ROE Firm size Log employment Log staff cost Log wages
Diff-in-diff 8.246*** 1.503 0.623*** 0.549 0.0542 0.550** 0.606*** 0.107
(2.260) (2.128) (0.226) (0.812) (1.516) (0.273) (0.224) (0.296)
Observations 317 317 385 385 385 385 385 385
Note: The independent variable is the share of female members over the total members of the respective board in columns (1) and (2) and the
following financial variables: log of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization in column (3), return on assets in column (4), return
on equity in column (5), log of firm assets in column (6), log of the number of employees in column (7) and log of wages and salaries in column (8).
The treatment year is 2013. Eligible firms are those that satisfied the requirements of the quota law when it was passed: being listed and subject to
parity co-determination under the Co-determination Act. The control group has been matched using propensity scores. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Significance * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Source: Muessig Verlag (2016): Die Großen 500, Datastream and Compustat Global.
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